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FAIR LABOR STANDARD'S ACT

LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF THE FEDERAL
FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
By
HERMAN

A.

WECHT*

Of The Philadelphia Bar
The economic importance of federal wage and hour controls in modern business and industry is now universally recognized. The application of these controls
on a daily basis to almost every aspect of the employment relationship of persons
who are either engaged "in interstate or foreign commerce" or "production of
goods for interstate or foreign commerce" clearly demonstrates the extent to
which such controls affect the affairs of employers in business and industry as
well as the millions of persons who are employed by them.1 Hence, just as wage
and hour controls have exerted considerable influence in the economic planning
of other enlightened countries, so the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 is an
important factor in our business and industry planning.
But a law such as this one which so basically affects the daily affairs of both
employer and employee, and which is so comprehensive in its scope, is naturally
very complicated, difficult to understand and still' more difficult to apply. It will
probably be some time before this law will have developed a status and meaning
necessary to satisfy the thinking and requirements of all those persons who are
subject to its provisions.
I doubt if many persons realize the intricate problems with which the courts
have been and are yet confronted in fixing the legal status of persons involved
in these relationships, and the determination of rights -and liabilities between
litigants subject to this law and the administrative regulations under it designed
to control wages and hours of employed persons within the ambit of the act, but
thousands of decisions upon many phases of that subject are sufficient proof of
these facts.
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 19381a (hereinafter called "FLSA")
with some amendments2 has been in operation for nearly thirteen years. The
*LL.B., Temple University; Member Philadelphia Bar since 1929; Consultant, lecturer, and
writer on federal wage-hour and wage stabilization problems; author WAGE-HOUR LAW published
1951.
1 Shortly after the FLSA became operative, it was estimated that the act was applicable to 15,500,000 persons employed by more than 360,000 employers in 48 states, the District of Columbia,
Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas
in Cudahy Packing Co., of La., v. Holland, 315 U. S. 785.
1& Act of June 25, 1938, c. 676, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess., 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U. S. C. Sections
201-219.
0 For a comprehensive list of amendments to the act, see WAGE-HoUR LAW by Wecht, volume
on "Coverage" note 39 on page 21 and note 41 on page 22.
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case law upon the subject is very much unsettled, abounding in conflicting interpretations concerning its application to an inestimable number of involved fact
situations. Governing as it does, so great a section of our people over an extensive
geographical area, the rules imposed are very complicated. There are problems
within problems, exceptions to most of the rules, and exceptions to some of the
exceptions. Those who have had the responsibility of solving one of these complex problems will readily comprehend the accuracy of this statement. One will
also recognize the tremendous task of regulating wages, hours, child labor and
employment practices on so broad and sweeping a scale and the difficulty of
promulgating a law and regulations which are applicable on a country-wide basis
without interfering with long established business and industry methods and
procedures. Ergo, the Supreme Court of the United States has said that these
controls are difficult to apply since the amount of wages and the nature of employment practices vary according to geographical location as well as from industry to
industry and from factory to factory.8
In addition to these complexities, further confusion arises from the difference between the "commerce power" generally exercised by Congress and
the extent to which the same power has been exercised by it in the FLSA. It
is important to recognize and understand this distinction.
Exercise of Commerce Power by Congress in other Legislation
The line of demarcation in the ruling cases of the Supreme Court of the
United States construing the exercise and validity of the use of the federal commerce power applied to activities related to intrastate production or manufacturing is the case of NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 81 L. Ed.
563, 57 S.Ct. 615.
Upon other problems related to the facts in that case the Supreme Court had
ruled (1) the validity of an exercise of the commerce power by Congress required
a showing of activities which were a constant and recurring burden and obstruction
upon interstate or foreign commerce; 4 (2) the use of the federal commerce
power was not limited to transactions which were in and of themselves interstate commerce, if such transactions interfered with the free flow of interstate
commerce; 5 (3) a regulation designed to control intrastate transactions deemed
8 Concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in Walling v. Portland Terminal Company, 330
U. S. 148.
4 Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495; Chicago Board of Trade v. Olson 262 U. S. 1, 32. Compare Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44, 69. See also Tagg v. Moorhead, 280 U. S. 420. Compare also,
United Mine Workers v. Coronado Co., 259 U. S. 344 and Coronado Co., v. United Mine Workers,
268 U. S. 295.
5 Stafford v. Wallace, n. 4, sustaining the Packers and Stockyards Act (42 Stat. 159) holding
that the stockyards were the throat through which the current of commerce flowed and transactions
which occurred there were part of the flow of commerce subject to the federal power. Chicago Board
of Trade v. Olson, rupra, in which the court sustained the use of the commerce power in the Grain
Futures Act of 1922 (42 Stat. 998) with respect to transactions on the Chicago board, of trade
which were not in and of themselves interstate commerce.
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to be an essential part of a "flow" of interstate or foreign commerce, constituted
a valid exercise of the congressional commerce power,6 and such transactions
are not rendered immune because they grow out of labor disputes. 7 But upon the
premise that manufacturing in itself was not commerce (there being no immediacy or directness of such intrastate activities to interstate commerce or foreign
commerce), it had been held 8 that the effect of such activities were so remote
as to be beyond federal control.
Though the commerce power employed in the Sherman Anti-Trust Act was
sustained when applied to the conduct of employees engaged in intrastate production which had the effect of restraining or controlling the supply of an article
entering and moving in interstate commerce, or the price of it in interstate
6 The Shreveport Case, 234 U .S. 342 and Houston etc. Dy. Co., v. United States, 234 U. S.
342, sustaining the use of the federal commerce power regulating intrastate rates of interstate
carriers where the effect of the rates is to burden interstate commerce; Southern Ry. Co., v. United
States, 222 U. S. 20, permitting regulations by Congress to compel the adoption of safety appliances
on rolling stock moving intrastate because of the relation to and effect of such appliances upon

interstate traffic moving over the same railroad; Balt. & Ohio R. R. Co., v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U. S. 612, sustaining the power of Congress to prescribe maximum hours for employees
engaged in intrastate activity connected with the movement of any train, i.e., activities of train dispatchers and telegraphers.
7 Texas & N. 0. R. Co., v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks, 281 U. S. 548, holding
a statute protecting the rights of collective bargaining by railway employees was within the competence of Congress under the commerce clause and that its provisions extended to clerks who
had no direct contact with the actual facilities of railroad transportation. See also, The Virginia
Railway Co., v. System Federation No. 40, 301 U. S. 515 and United States v. Ry. Employees etc.,
290 Fed. 978. Attention of the reader is also directed to wage and hour provisions of the Adamson
Act, 39 Stat. 721, 45 U. S. C. Sections 61-66, sustained by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332. For other illustrations of the exercise of the federal
commerce power see WAGE-HoUR LAw by WECHT under "Federal Controls" there discussed.
8 Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1; United Mine Workers v. Coronado Co., 259 U. S. 408; Oliver
Iron Co., v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172; United Leather Workers v. Herkert, 265 U. S. 457; Industrial
Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 64; Compare Coronado Co., v. United Mine Workers, 268
U. S. 295 and Bedford Stone Cutters Ass'n v. Bedford Cut Stone Co, 274 U. S. 37.
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markets,9 nevertheless, upon the authority of Schechter v. United States, 295 U. S.
495, and Carter Coal Co., v. Carter, 298 U. S.238, a number of federal inferior
courts held the National Labor Relations Act to be an invalid exercise of the
federal commerce power when, applied to relations between employers and employees engaged in intrastate or local production of goods subsequently shipped
in interstate commerce.
In the NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., case, supra, reversing the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals and thereby sustaining the validity of the NLRA, the
Supreme Court pointed to its former rulings on the subject of the use of the federal
commerce power and then held:
"the congressional authority to protect interstate commerce from burdens
and obstructions is not limited to transactions which can be deemed to
be an essential part of a "flow" of interstate or foreign commerce. Burdens and obstructions may be due to injurious actions springing from other
sources. (emphasis supplied) The fundamental principle is that the power
to regulate commerce is the power to enact 'all appropriate legislation'
for 'its protection and advancement' . . . to adopt measures 'to promote
its growth and insure its safety' . . . 'to foster, protect, control and restrain' . . . 'That power is pl'enary and may be exerted to protect interstate commerce' no matter what the source of the dangers which threaten
it' ... Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately
considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate
commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the
power to exercise that control."
This, the court indicated, was the reasoning in the cases under the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act sustaining the use of the federal commerce power where the
close and intimate effect which brought them within the reach of the federal
power was due to activities related to manufacturing although such manufacturing when separately considered was local. 10
Refusing to apply the rulings of the Schechter and Carter cases, supra, the
Supreme Court held they were not controlling since in the former, the decision
was based on the fact that the effect of the activities on interstate commerce was
so remote as to be beyond the federal power, and in the latter, the decision turned on the fact that there was an improper delegation of legislative power, and
the requirements not only went beyond any sustainable measure of protection
of interstate commerce but were also inconsistent with due process."
9 Loewe v. Lawler, 208 U. S. 274; Coronado Coal Co., v. United Mine Workers, n. 8; Bedford
Stone Cutters Ass'n v. Bedford Stone Co., supra; where, though, the reduction in the supply of an
article to be shipped in interstate commerce by the illegal or tortious prevent of its manufacture or
production is ordinarily an indirect and remote obstruction to that commerce, yet where the intent,
inferred from the proof of direct and substantial effect produced by employees conduct, is shown
to be to restrain or control the supply entering and moving in interstate commerce, or the price
in interstate markets, their action is a direct violation of the Anti-Trust Act.
10 Standard 0;l anxd American Tobacco Co. cases, 221 U. S. 1, 106.
11 But Mr. Justice Jackson in his book (written before his appointment to the Supreme Court)
on THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY indicates other reasons impelled this distinction.
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PriorDiscussion Relates to Activities "Affecting" Commerce
In all of the congressional legislation cited to this article thus far, it is

clear that it was the "effect" upon commerce not the source of the injury which
was the criterion. The intent of Congress expressed in the findings and policy
of this legislation was to bring within the scope thereof any transactions which
"affected" interstate or foreign commerce, regardless of the origin of the goods,
the place of sale or the percentage of interstate sales.' 2 The question was simply
one of degree as to whether the facts presented were within the regulated area.
This is the principle which distinguishes the use of the federal commerce power
in the aforementioned legislation from the use of the same power in the FLSA.
Extent of Commerce Power Exercised by Congress in FLSA

It would not be possible, in the space allotted for this discussion, to present
a detailed account of the reasons of Congress where lines are drawn and limita-

tions are imposed under a federal enactment as between those controls which
are to be exercised by the federal government and those which are left to the

states. It is generally considered that such legislation is, in a large measure, a
matter of give and take as between assertions of new power by the central

government and the historic functions of the individual states. In view of the
fabulous growth of our manufacturing and business economy on a national scale,
it was inevitable that the central government assert its authority over L-conomic
enterprise by assuming powers previously exercised or which might have been
exercised by the states. 13 Hence, laws of this character cannot be construed without
14
reference to and regard for the implications of our dual form of government.

An illustration of the extent of this give and take by Congress between
federal and state governments which generally varies with the subject matter,
the history, the specific terms and the procedures involved in the legislations, is
to be found in the remarks of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking on the subject
in Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517, he said:

"Thus while a phase of industrial enterprise may be subject to control
under the National Labor Relations Act, a different phase of the same

enterprise may not come within the 'commerce' protected by the Sher12 Santa Cruz Packing Co, v. NLRB, 303 U. S. 453; NLRB v. Fainblatt 306 U. S. 601. However,
it has been held by the National Labor Relations Board that where the "effect" on interstate commerce is insubstantial, it will decline jurisdiction because assuming jurisdiction would not effectuate the policies of the N. L. R. A. See In re: Nickerson, 78 N. L. R. B. 625; In Re: Tampa
Sand and Material Co., 78 N. L. R. B. 629; In Re: Sta-Kleen Bakery, Inc., 78 N. L. R. B. 798.
13 Consolidated Edison Co., v. NLRB, (U. S. Sup. Ct.) 1 Labor Cases 117, 120.
14 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 81, where in discussing the validity of the
National Labor Relations Act, referring to our dual form of government, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes
said:
"Undoubtedly the scope of this power must be considered in the light of our dual form
of government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce
so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized government."
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man Law. Compare for example United Leather Workers v. Herkert, 265
U. S. 457, and Levering & G. Co., 1. Morrin, 289 U. S. 103 with Labor
Board v. Friedman-Harry' Marks Clothing Co. 301, U. S. 58 and Labor
Board v. Fainblatt, 306 U. S. 601. Similar y, enterprises subject to federal
industrial regulation may nevertheless be taxed by the states without putting an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. Compare Heisler
v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. S. 245, and Oliver Iron Co., v. Lord,
262 U. S. 172, with Sunshine Coal Co., v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381."
A declaration of new dominance by the central government does not necessarily mean that Congress in enacting such new legislation intended to embrace
all the situations which may conceivably be encompassed within the evils giving
rise to such legislation.'" Any and all situations involved may be reached where the
objective concerns only a single unitary government, but this is not the case
where the underlying assumptions of our dual form of government cut across what
might otherwise be the implied range of the legislation. It is a long-settled principle
that Congress may choose to regulate only a part of what it can constitutionally
16
control leaving local matters for the states.
In determining the incidence of the FLSA it is requisitive in the first
instance to evaluate the relationship between the facts in each case and the
extent of the commerce power exercised by Congress in enacting the FLSA,
for unlike the many other congressional statutes earlier discussed, the legislative
history of the original FLSA and its 1949 Amendments conclusively proves
that Congress did not see fit to exhaust its constitutional power over commerce.
Hence, "this requires that the courts assume the sole duty of applying ad hoc
the provisions of the FLSA to an unlimited variety of involved industrial and
business situations without the aid of constitutional criteria or preliminary administrative process for ascertaining whether the particular situation is within the
regulated area.''17 There is no mathematical formula which can be devised for
at once determining whether or not a given situation falls within the ambit of the
act, for like all other questions which involve the commerce power by Congress
they do not permit of the formulation of a mechanical method for determining
the incidence of the power.' 8 Each case must be resolved on its own facts with
due consideration given to the law established in other cases on the same question
where the facts are similar. Every new situation calls for a rational judgment
as the facts vary,19 for each new problem becomes one of degree to be resolved
15 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 81. This fact is revealed by the history
of the FLSA, the congressional regulation over the rates of inteistate carriers which affect commerce, and the amendment of August 11, 1939 to the Federal Employers Liability Act which extended the scope of the act to employees "who shall in any way directly or closely and substantially affect
interstate commerce. (53 Stat. 1404).
16 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., n. 15; and see extended discusion of this subject
in WAGE-HOUR LAW by WECHT, pages 261 et seq.
17 Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517.
18 Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co., v. NLRB, 303 U. S. 453.
19 Walling v. Twyeffort, 158 F.2d 944 (CCA2), cert den. 331 U. S.851.

FAIR LABOR STANDARD'S ACT

by a process of drawing lines.2 0 But such lines are not susceptible of mathematical
calculation according to fixed points. In fixing the points according to which
the lines are drawn, all of the facts and inferences must be carefully weighed and
placed in the proper perspective to determine whether or not the subject at hand
falls within the regulated sphere.
What Constitutes Commerce
Since its departure from the limited definition of commerce in the Schechter
and Carter Coal Co., cases, supra, the Supreme Court of the United States as late
as Armour & Co., v. Wantock, 323 U. S. 126, defines "commerce" used in the
FLSA as having a much broader significance than the mere manufacture or physical
production of goods. The intent of the act is held to include those transactions,
conditions and relationships which were known and acknowledged as constituting
21
commerce prior thereto, which includes not only the manufacturing of the goods
and the shipment thereof, but the carriers and instrumentalities by which such
commerce is carried on. By including the terms "transportation" and "transmission"
in the clause defining "commerce" 2 2 Congress considerably broadened and txtended its comprehension so as to include the instrumentalities which are employed 2s and the common understanding of the term, even if at variance with
the statutory definition, cannot be substituted for it.24
Services Which Merely Affect Commerce
But though the foregoing statement would seem to indicate that the range
of the FLSA is all inclusive, and notwithstanding that its application has been
held to extend to the farthest reaches of the channels of interstate commerce, 2 5
yet, Congress did not extend the power to the limit of its authority. 26 Hence it
does not have the same scope as those statutes hereinbefore discussed so as to reach
activities of employees which only "affect" commerce. 27 For example, a contention
20 10 E. 40th Street Bldg. Corp., v. Callus, 325 U. S. 578 and compare this case with Borden v.
Borella, 325 U. S. 679.
21 United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U. S. 1; Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.
S. 126.
22 Section 3 (b) of FLSA as amended.
28

Horton v. Wilson & Co., 223 N. C. 71, 25 S. E. 2d 258.

Umthum v. Day & Zimmerman, 235 Iowa 293, 16 N. W. 2d 258.
Walling v. Mutual Whole. Grocery Co., 141 F.2d 331 (CCA8).
26 Congress may legislate upon a part of the subject leaving other evils to be remedied by the
states. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., n. 15.
27 McCleod v. Threkfeld, 319 U. S. 491; Higgins v. Carr Bros., 317 U. S. 572; Walling v.
Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U. S. 564; Noonan v. Fruco Const. Co., 140 F.2d 633 (CCA7);
Roland Elec. Co., v. Walling, 326 U. S. 657.
24
25
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that the act has the same scope as the National Labor Relations Act so as to
28
apply to any occupation which "affects" commerce was dismissed.
Purposes of FLSA
The original FLSA was considered by Congress at a time when the country
was recovering from the effects of a severe depression. The causes and effect of a
badly managed economy were still fresh in the minds of the members of the
Congress. Against such a background Congress could more aptly recognize those
evils which contributed to the economic downfall and thus better evaluate its
findings. 29
It found substandard labor conditions to exist in industries engaged in commerce and in production of goods for commerce, which, if permitted to continue
by perpetuating themselves through the continued use of the instrumentalities of
interstate and foreign commerce, would burden the free flow of goods, interfere
with orderly fair marketing and give rise to unfair methods of competition.O

In order to correct these conditions, since history and experience had already indicated that these conditions could not be controlled by state legislation on the
subject, Congress enacted the instant statute controlling wage and hour standards
of employment in private industry and business, including child labor.
Various purposes ascribed to the FLSA by the courts have been (1) to secure
for those unorganized workers who lack sufficient bargaining power a minimum
subsistence wage; 81 (2) to extend the frontiers of social progress by insuring2
to all able-bodied working men and women a fair days' pay for a fair days' work;
(3) by a reduction in hours to spread employment; 83 (4) to place a floor under
28 Keen v. Mid-Cont. Pet. Co., 157 F.2d 310, affirming 63 F. Supp. 120 (D. C. Iowa). Early
drafts of the act embodied provisions which would have applied the act where goods were sold and
shipped in commerce to a substantial extent, or to "employers engaged in commerce in any industry
affecting commerce." In connection with the last proposal the Secretary of Labor would have been
given authority to isue an order declaring an industry to be one "affecting commerce" and thus
covered by the act where he found that the industry was dependent for its existence upon "substantial purchases or sales in commerce and upon transportation in commerce." These earlier
drafts were rejec~ed in favor of the coverage provisions contained in the present law. See H. R.
Rep. 7200, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced May 14, 1937; Amendment to S. 2475, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess., and Committee prints 4/15/38, S. 2475, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. Such reject-confirms the
congressional intent to distinguish the commerce power used in the FLSA from the previous use of
that power.
29 See statement of conclusions of Congress committee conducting hearings H. R. Rep. No.
2182, 75th Cong., page 6 of Joint Hearings on H. R. No. 7200 and S. 2475. For a further detailed
discussion see WEc.HT on WAGE-HOUR LAW, page 18 et seq.
80 H. R. Rep. 2182 etc., note 16.
81 Brooklyn Say. Bank v. O'Neill, 324 U. S. 697, 5 WH Cases 232; Murray v. Noblesville Mill.
Co., 318 U. S. 775, 2 WH Cases 257; Duke v. Helena-Glendale Ferry co., 203 Ark. 865, 2 WH
Cases 891.
82 Phillips v. Walling, 324 U. S. 490, 5 WH Cases 186.
88 Overnight Transp. Co., v. Missell, 316 U. S. 572, 2 WH Cases 46.
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wages and a ceiling over hours;3 4 (5) to promote economic stability through increased purchasing. power; (6) to regulate wages industrywide, and under conditions which would not give one section of it a competitive advantage over
another; 85 (7) without substantially curtailing employment or earning power,3"
to maintain a decent standard of living.3 7
Aside from the purposes already discussed, the fundamental aim of the FLSA
is to proscribe the shipment into interstate or foreign commerce of goods, which
at the time of manufacture"5 are made under substandard labor conditions, and
thus to make effective the congressional conception of "public policy" that
interstate commerce should not be us-ed for competition which is injurious to the
commerce and to the states from and to which it flows.39
Constitutionality and Construction
It is highly significant that the entire field of enlightened federal labor
relations legislation was made possible as a result of the interpretation by the
Supreme Court of the United States of legislation dealing with the subject of
40
wages.
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 in which thie Supreme Court of the
United States ruled that Congress was without power to exclude the products of
child labor from interstate commerce was viewed as an effective bar to wage
legislation covering employment in private industry. On the authority of that
case the same court had several times struck down minimum wage legislation
by the states designed for the protection of women and minors employed in
private industry, 41 although it had upheld state legislation providing maximum
work hours limitations for women and minors in the same employment. 42 In
West Coast Hotel Co., v. Parish,48 the Court was called upon to consider the
validity of legislation of the State of Washington, 44 which was identical with the
other state legislation previously invalidated in the cases cited to this text. 45
Contrary to the popular belief and quite by surprise, the Supreme Court re-examined
84 Id. And see also the Message of President Roosevelt to Congress in May, 1937, urging enactment of a law to establish fair labor standards, at page 17 of WECHT on WAGE-HOUR LAW;
Culket v. Martin Neb. Co., (D. C. Neb.) 10 WH Cases 225.
85 Columbus & G. Ry. Co., v. Administrator, 126 F. 2d 136 (CCA5), 2 WH Cases 106; Tobin
v. Creek Coal Co., (D. C. Utah-1951) 10 WH Cases 135.
86 Walling v. Plymouth Mfg. Corp., 139 F.2d 178, cert. den. 332 U. S. 741.
87 Fleming v. A. H. Belo Corp., 316 U. S. 624, 2 WH Cases 396.
88 United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U. S. 1, 2 WH Cases 47.
89 Sun Pub. Co., v. Walling, 140 F.2d 445, cert. den. 322 U. S. 728, 4 WH Cases 443; Tenn.
Coal & Iron Co., v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U. S. 590, 5 WH Cases 1026.
40 West Coast Hotel Co., v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379.
41 Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U. S. 525; Moorehead v. New York, ex rel. Tipaldo, 298
U. S. 587.
42 Steetler v. OI-ira, 69 Oregon 519 and Simpson v. O'Hara, 70 Oregon 261 affirmed in 243 U.
S. 629.
48 300 U. S. 379.
44 Laws of 1913 Washington, chap. 174, REMMINGTONS' REV. STAT., 1932.
45 See cases cited in note 41.
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the whole question of wage laws applicable to private industry and reviewed
its ruling in the Hammer v. Dagenhart case, supra. After reviewing the cases,
both before and aftcr the decision of that case, the Court abandoned its former
position holding that case
"was a departure from the principles which have prevailed in the interpretation of the commerce clause both before and since the decision and
that such vitality as it there had, has long been exhausted. It should be,
and now is, overruled."
That ruling eliminated any further necessity to proceed with a long standing plan
to amend the Constitution, then being considered for ratification by the states, on
the issue of child labor. It likewise was the impelling force which caused President
Roosevelt to ask Congress for the enactment of a law to establish fair labor
standards, resulting in the enactment of the FLSA. This ruling by the Supreme
Court of the United States marks the beginning of a long line of cases construing the validity of "new deal" legislation in which it would appear that
the majority of the court adopted a conception of the extent of the federal
46
commerce power which was much broader than its range as previously construed.
The fundamental basis for the exercise of the federal commerce power is that
"the power to regulate commerce is the power to prescribe the rule by which
such power is governed. " 47 Such power being full and complete in itself, it may
be used to surpress competition which it has condemned as unfair, to the end
of protecting such commerce against dislocation through the use of facilities of
such interstate commerce for competition by goods produced under substandard
labor conditions with those produced under the prescribed or better labor conditions. Upon these premises the use of the federal commerce power in the FLSA
was held to be a valid exercise of the right to control intrastate activities related
to interstate or foreign commerce including the production of goods for interstate or foreign commerce. 48 This power of Congress to regulate wages and
of industry
and hours has been upheld by the courts when applied to many phases
49
and business, and its constitutionality is now an accepted fact.
In construing this type of legislation, born of economic and social pressure,
attempting to harmonize discordant socio-economic forces, courts have expressed
themselves as bound to view such legislation in the framework of the conditions
46

Mr. Justice Jackson in his book THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (written prior to

his appointment Lo the Supreme Court of the United States), characterizes this new position by the
court as a retreat in the existing dispute between the court and the other departments of the
government in "the battle for judicial supremacy."
47 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196; see the same and similar rules expressed in NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., n. 15, and the other cases on the commerce power cited to this
article.
48 United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 N. S. 100, 1 WH Cases 17; Kirschbaum v.
Walling, 316 U. S. 517, 2 WH Cases 34; Tobin v. Wilson (D. C. II. 1951) 10 WH Cases 210.
49 See note 59 on page 25 of WAGE-HOUR LAw by WECHT. See also Culkin v. Martin Neb. Co.,
(D. C. Neb. 1951) 10 WH Cases 225.
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aimed to be remedied thereby. Consequently, it is vital that the congressional
findings and policy of such statutes as this one be carefully examined to determine
the intent of the lawmakers.
The guiding principles underlying the rules construing the provisions of
the FLSA are to be found in the objectives of that statute as expressed in its
findings and declaration of policy. 50 These objectives clearly demonstrate that
the act, salutary and comprehensive in its aims and highly remedial in character,
is entitled to be construed liberally. 51 This does not require an interpretation
which is opposed to the obvious meaning and purpose of the act, 52 but it does
require that the act as a whole must be given a liberal interpretation in accordance
with the legislative aims expressed therein. 53
So as to make the act as complete in itself as possible, 54 Congress defined
many of its important terms, thus declaring in the body of the act (Section 3
has been called the "dictionary of the act") the construction to be placed thereon.566
Such statutory definitions have long been held to prevail over colloquial meanings.
Hence, when they are complete in themselves as defined, they are controlling
in construing the particular statute, 57 so that there is no necessity for resorting
to other statutes or to 'extraneous considerations in an effort to construe and give
to such language used another and different meaning, especially those statutes
and considerations on different subjects and having purposes which are different
from the FLSA.5 8 This rule does not deny the right or necessity to define words
used in the definition where Congress fails to define such words. However, in
that situation such words must be taken to mean what they mean when used in
the ordinary sense, 59 controlled by the context and the legislative intent, and taking
into consideration that the FLSA is highly remedial and humanitarian, therefore,
the ordinary meanings which are supplied for undefined words should be the
liberal interpretations or meanings thereof which best serve to carry out the
purposes stated therein by Congress. °
In construing any provision of the FLSA, in the first instance, one must
not overlook the purposes and the intent of Congress in choosing the language
50 Sections 2(a) and 2(b) of the FLSA.
51 McComb v. Farmers' Res. Co., 335 U. S. 809; Walling v. Rutherford Food Corp., 156 F.2d 513,
aff'd 331 U. S. 722. For the same reasons, the exemption provisions of the act are to be strictly construed against the employer claiming them.
52 Blankenship v. Western U. Tel. Co., (D. C. W. Va.) 67 F. Supp. 265.
53 Musteen v. Johnson, 133 F.2d 106 (CCA3).
54 Walling v. McKay, (D. C. Neb.) 70 F. Supp. 160, aff'd 164 F.2d 40.
56
56

Creekmore v. Public Belt Comm., 134 F.2d 376, cert. den. 320 U. S. 742.
Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U. S. 87, 95.

57 Western U. Tel. Co., v. Lenroot, 323 U. S. 490.
58 United States v. Colorado N.'W. R. Co., 157 F.2d 321 (CCA8), McComb v. Homeworkers
, (D. C.
F. Supp .Cooperative, 176 F.2d 633 (CCA4). Welsh v. Dillner Transfer Co. Pa. 1950) 9 WH Cases 482.

59
60

Walling v. Wolferman, 54 F. Supp. 917 (D. C. Mo.) appeal dismissed in 144 F.2d 354.
Western U. Tel. Co., v. Lenroot, note 52.
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used. 61 Where the language is not clear, resort may be had to its legislative
•history 62 to construe it so as to effectuate the intent of Congress, 6" in a manner
consistent with the practical meaning and effect in a particular situation.6 4 Likewise, in such a situation, though the rule is otherwise where the meaning of the
statute is plain, it is proper to refer to rulings construing other statutory definitions
in regard to terms used in the FLSA, especially where they are statutes in pari
materia.6 5 For example, judicial interpretations of interstate commerce are as
pertin'ent to consideration of the commerce definition in the FLSA as they would
be in any other statute where the question is whether employee or employer is engaged in interstate commerce. 66 If the statutory meaning is clear, there is, of course,
67
no occasion to resort to rules of construction.
Contemporaneous Construction of Act by Secretary of Labor
It has long been a settled policy of the judiciary that the contemporaneous
interpretation by officers, administrative department heads, and others officially
charged with the duty of administering and enforcing a statute is entitled to respect in ascertaining the meaning to be applied to the statute, 68 and this policy
has been extended to cases arising under the FLSA. 69 Although the function of
finally construing and interpreting the written laws belongs to the judiciary, 70 the
executive department, in the case of the FLSA represented by the Secretary of
Labor, (formerly the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division)71 may be required by necessity to place its own interpretations upon the laws in advance
72
of their exposition by the courts.
It is common knowledge that the interpretative bulletins of the Wage and
Hour Division of the Department of Labor are prepared by experienced lawyers
who are specialists in the field, 73 and while they are not controlling on the
courts, 74 they do constitute a body of experienced and informed judgment to
Armour & Co., v. Wantock, 323 U. S. 126.
62 Jewell Ridge Coal Co., v. Local Union etc., 53 F. Supp. 935 (D. C. Va.) affirmed (CCA4)
cert. den. 322 U. S. 756, but see the comments on this subject in the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in Powell v. U. S. Cartridge Co., 339 U. S. 497, in which he indicates that
the court up to that time had misconceived the purpose and intent of Congress in the FLSA.
63 Murray v. Noblesville Mill. Co., note 31.
64 Republic Pictures Corp., v. Kappler. 151 F.2d 543 (CCA7).
65 Rutherford Food Corp., v. McComb, 331 U. S. 722.
66 Shannon v. Bob Const. Co., 8 So.2d 542 (La. App.)
67 Western U. Tel. Co., v. Lenroot, note 52; Andrews v. St. Louis etc. Co., 107 F.2d 462 (CCA8).
Welsh v. Dillner etc. Co. note 58.
68 Norwegian Nitrogen Co., v. United States, 288 U. S. 294, 315.
69 United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U. S. 534; Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.
S. 134; Vemillya-Brown Co., v. Connell, 335 U. S. 337.
70 Fleming v. A. H. Belo Corp., 121 F.2d 207, aff'd 316 U. S. 424.
71 Reorganization Bill No. 6 adopted by Congress in 1950. The duties of the Administrator
were transferred to the Sec'y of Labor who redelegated them back to the Administrator. A procedural
change.
72 Norwegian Nitrogen Co., v. United States, note 68, supra.
73 McComb v. Sheppard-Niles Co., 171 F.2d 69, cert. den. 336 U. S. 690.
74 Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 331 U. S. 784.
61
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which the courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. 75 One very persuasive argument in favor of the use of such contemporaneous interpretative
bulletins as aids to statutory construction is that uniformity of interpretation and
operation throughout the country, which is in every way desirable, will be promoted thereby. 76 However, by way of caution, the meaning of the act may not be
sought in its purely legal interpretation by the legal staff of the Wage and Hour
Division, for, if this were so, the Secretary of Labor would be both the litigant
77
and the judge in his own case who has written the decision beforehand.
The weight to be accorded by the court to the interpretations of the Secretary
of Labor is dependent upon the thoroughness evident in their consideration, validity of reasoning and consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, 78 subject further, that interested persons will not be permitted to alter the plain meaning
not binding on the court, they will be entitled
of the act,7 9 and though they are
to respect in construing the act. 80
Since the enactment of the Portal-to-Portal Act, 81 the rulings and interpretative bulletins of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division and now the
rulings and interpretative bulletins of the Secretary of Labor, play a very significant
role in the determination of substantive rights and liabilities of both employees
and employers under the FLSA where the 'employer satisfies the court that his
action is in conformity with such ruling or interpretation, that he relied com82
pletely upon such ruling or interpretation and that his action was in good faith.
75 Mabee v. White Plains Pub. Co., 327 U. S. 178.
76 Graves v. Armstrong Creamery Co., 154 Kan. 365, 118 P.2d 613.
77 Fleming v. A. H. Belo Corp., note 70.
78 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134.
79 Jewell Ridge Coal Corp., v. Local etc., 53 F. Supp. 936 (D. C. Va.) affirmed (CCA4) cert.
den. 322 U. S. 756.
80 Roberg v. Phipps Estate, 156 F.2d 958 (CCA2) where the court refused to apply the literal
interpretation of the act by the administrator, and adopted a more liberal construction of the FLSA.
an act to relieve
81 Public law No. 49. 80th Cong., chapter 22, 1st Sess., 29 U. S. C. A.-,
employers from certain liabilities under the FLSA, as amended, the Walsh-Healey Act and the
Davis-Bacon Act. rhough the Supreme Court has not yet dealt directly with the validity of the
Act, it has refused to grant certiorari in a number of cases wherein the act was held constitutional
by the lower courts. Seesc v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 74 F. Supp. 412, affirmed 168 F.2d 58 (CCA4) ;
Attalah v. Hubbert 3c Son, Inc., 168 F.2d 993 (CCA4), cert. den. 335 U. S. 868; Darr v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 169 F 2d 262 (CCA2), cert. den. 335 U. S. 871; Battaglia v. General Motors Corp.,
169 F.2d 254 (CCA2), cert. den. 335 U. S. 887.
82 Like almost all other problems under FLSA, the elements of conformity, reliance, and good
faith, must be detemined on the facts in each case as it arises. As an example of conflicting opinions
10 WH Cases
F. Supp. -,
see Addison v. Huron Stevadoring Corp., (D. C. N. Y. 1951) 40, where employer who relied on ruling of War Shipping Administration was relieved of certain liability notwithstanding conflicting ruling of the Wage and Hour Division; see also Tripp v.
F.2d , 10 WH Cases 242, in which an employer who relied upon
May, (CCA7-1951) statements in correspondence made by the Regional attorney of the Wage and Hour Division was
held not to be entitled to relief under the Portal-to-Portal Act. As to the exact nature of ruling or
interpretation which may be relied on see Burke v. Mesta Machine Co., 79 F. Supp. 583 (D. C. Pa.)
8 WH Cases 175 and Moss v. Hawaiian SS. Co. 83 F. Supp. 528 (D. C. Calif.) 8 WH Cases 652.
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Federal Rulings Controlling88
In dealing with actions arising under the FLSA, state courts have expressed
themselves as being bound to apply the rules of construction obtaining in the federal jurisdictions, 84 following the implications of the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States and th'e other federal courts construing the act and
applying such implications to new situations. 85 The decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States are binding on the Circuit Courts of Appeal of the
United States, 86 and the United States District Courts. 87 It is now generally held
that state law and policy which conflicts with the policy stated by Congress in the
88
FLSA must yield to the federal law and policy established thereby.

Relationship of FLSA to Other Federal Laws

Without exception it has been held that the FLSA is not in conflict with other
federal laws. The problems arising out of other federal legislation having different legislative backgrounds are generally held not conclusive in determining the

legislative intent in enacting the instant statute. 89 By way of illustration, it has
been held (1) the "Eight Hour Law" as amended in 1940 to prohibit government

contractors from employing certain persons in excess of eight hours per day without payment of overtime compensation, did not repeal the FLSA of 1938;91)
91
(2) the FLSA and the Federal Highway Act of 1921 are not inconsistent; nor
is the instant act irreconcilable with the Davis-Bacon Act, since the latter applies

only to laborers and mechanics engaged on building projects financed with gov88 Section 16 of the FLSA provides, an action to recover back wages may be brought in any
court of competent jurisdiction, which has been held to include state courts. Mizrahi v. Pandora
Frocks, 86 F. Supp. 958 (D. C. N. Y. 1949).
84 Lyons v. Ferguson Co., 16 So.2d 586 (La. App.); Horton v. Wilson & Co., 223 N. C. 71,
25 S. E. 2d 437. But see Crowe v. Elmhurst Const. Co., 74 N. Y. Supp. 2d 445, 191 Misc. 585
holding, "The courts of the state (New York) are not bound to follow federal courts of the
first instance on federal questions"; and see also Gilley v. Coca-Cola Bott. Works, (Tenn. Ch.
Ct. 1950) 9 WH Cases 270 in which the court ruled:
"Numerous federal district court decisions have been cited by counsel applying the doctrine of 'de minimis' in various fact situations. Some cannot be reconciled and some
support each position here. This is natural where the test is relative and to an extent subjective. The ,'sult reached seems to be in accord with decisions in our own iurisdiction,
which are given paramount consideration absent federal authority controlling. (italics
supplied).
It is difficult for the writer to understand this ruling in the light of Mabee v. White Plains Pub.
Co., 327 U. S. 178, Santa Cruz Packing Co., v. NLRB, 303 U. S. 453 and NLRB v. Fainblatt,
306 U. S. 601, all holding the doctrine of de minimis to be inapplicable in determining the incidence
of statutes to activities related to interstate commerce. See also Remizewski v. Parodi Cigar Co.,
64 A.2d 93 (N. J. Super. Ct. 1949) ; Hitchcock v. Union etc., Trust Co., 134 Conn. 246, 56 A.2d
655.
85 Brown v. Utica Ins. Co., 53 NYS2d 160, 184 Misc. 693.
86 Powell v. U. S. Cartridge Co., 339 U. S. 497.
87 Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., (D. C. Fla.) affirmed 128 F.2d 450 (CCA6) reversed on
other grounds 318 U. S. 125.
88 Davis v. Rockton R. R. Co., 65 F. Supp. 67 (D. C. S. C.).
89 Brooklyn Say. Bank v. O'Neill, 324 U. S. 697.
90 Walling v. Patton-Tulley Transp. Co., 134 F.2d 945 (CCA6).
91 Walling v. Craig, 53 F. Supp. 479 (D. C. Minn.).
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ernment funds, 92 (3) the fact, that certain foremen at a plant manufacturing
goods for the federal government have rights under the Walsh-Healey Public
Contracts Act, does not preclude them from seeking redress under the FLSA
for these statutes are not mutually exclusive; 93 and (4) the provisions of the
FLSA are applicable and govern the relationship between employees and cost-plusa fixed-fee contractors for the war department under authority of the National
94
Defense Act of 1940.
It is important to note, Section 18 of the FLSA provides that no provision
therein shall justify non-compliance with any other federal law which fixes higher
standards of employment. The language of this section discloses a congressional
awareness that coverage of the FLSA overlaps that of other federal statutes affecting labor standards.9 5
Conflict With State Laws
Earlier in this discussion it was indicated that it was the several states which
took the lead in enacting general wage and hour legislation in private industry.
The FLSA in many respects is similar to and may have been modeled after this
state legislation. It is understandable, therefore, why the FLSA is not in conflict
with the many state laws upon the same subject. Congress by providing in section
18 of the FLSA that the act should in no wise justify non-compliance with state
laws or municipal ordinances which establish higher minimum wages or shorter
maximum workweeks or workdays clearly manifested its recognition of the existence of these state statutes upon the subject. Further evidence of this fact are
thL provisions of the FLSA indicating that no provision therein relating to the
employment of child labor shall justify non-compliance with any state law or mun96
icipal ordinance which establishes a higher standard.
Although by the terms of the FLSA,9 7 an action to recover wages may be
brought in any court of competent jurisdiction, which as earlier related includes
state courts, nevertheless, this act is a law of the United States regulating interstate commerce, therefore, the federal courts have jurisdiction regardless of citizenship of the parties or the amount of money in controversy. 9 8 But, notwith92
93
94

Ortiz v. San Juan Dock Co., 5 WH Cases 662 (D. C. P. R.).
Brown v. Consolidated Vultee Air. Corp., 80 F. Supp. 257 (D. C. Ky.).
Powell v. U. S. Cartridge Co., 339 U. S. 497.
95 Id.
96 Sec. 18 of FLSA; H. R. Rep. No. 2182, 75th Cong., page 15.
97 Sec. 16(b) reads in part: the employee may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction. The 1949 amendments permits the administrator (now the Secretary of Labor) to sue
for back wages under certain conditions. Only the federal courts have jurisdiction in injuction pro-

ceedings.

98 Fishman v. Marcouse, 32 F. Supp. 460; and see Mulford v. Smith, 307 U .S. 38. Manosky
v. Bethlehem etc., Shipyard, 177 F.2d 466 (CCA7). R. H. White Co., v. Murphy, 310 Mass. 510.
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standing this plain statement, the question of jurisdiction is frequently raised
where transfer actions are instituted between state and federal courts. There is
considerable conflict of opinion on this problem which will continue to plague the
courts and lawyers until the question is squarely raised and settled by the Supreme
Court of the United States.
There is, however, unanimous agreement on the question of standards, for
the courts, almost universally following the practice of adopting the policy and
construction laid down by the federal courts, have sustained higher stindards
fixed by the state laws. 99 Since the FLSA does not impose absolute limitations
on hours, the many state laws which do enjoin against excessive hours of female
workers supersede the instant law. 100 But where the state law conflicts with the
FLSA, the latter will supersede the state law.' 01
Geographical Application
By virtue of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the United States,
Congress has the power to regulate commerce. The territorial extent to which
it exercised the commerce power in the FLSA is implied in the language of
10 2
Sections 3(b) and 3(c) thereof.
The application of the act to the area located within the boundaries of the 48
states and the District of Columbia is a simple problem. The use of the term "State"
as defined in section 3 (c) when read together with the definition of "Commerce",
viz: "trade ... among the several states or between any state and any place outside
09 See opinions of Louisiana Attorney General, September 13, 1938.
100 W & H Opinion letter, May 5th, 1942.
101 Tenn. Coal & Iron Co., v. Local 109 etc., 135 F.2d 320 (CCA5) affirmed 321 U. S. 590;
Divine v. Levy, 45 F. Supp. 49; Sirmon v. Cron etc. Drill Corp., 2 WH Cases 344 (D. C. La.);
Voutry v. General Baking Co., 39 F. Supp. 974 (D. C. Pa.); Greenberg v. Bailey Lumber Co., 1
WH Cases 1160, (D. C. Minn.).
As to.pleadings, practice and procedure in actions brought in state courts, it is generally held
that in those actions brought to enforce rights arising under the FLSA, jurisdiction of the court must
be invoked in conformity with local law, and such actions will be governed by state rules of
practice and procedure as to all matters pertaining to remedies. Archer v. Musick (Neb. Sup. Ct.)
147 Neb. 1018, 25 NW.2d 208; Thomas v. Hempt Bros., (Pa. Ct. Com. Pleas) 10 WH Cases 216;
Lambert v. Correct Mfg. Co., (Pa. Ct. Com. Pleas) 7 WH Cases 136; Kupp v. Deutsch, (Pa. Ct. Com.
Pleas) 7 WH Cases 136; Hunt v. Linken Ser. Corp., (Tenn. Sup. Ct.) 157 S.W.2d 608; Trugalli
v. Kaffee (N. Y. App. Div.) 273 N. Y. App. Div. 109, 75 N.Y.S.2d 157; Raymond v. Parrish, 71
Ga. App. 293; Compare, Stangler v. Calvert Mfg. Co., (N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 63 N.Y.S.2d 469; Felter
v. Stafford, Inc. (N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 6 WH Cases 388; Sauerzopf v. North Amer. Cement Corp., (N. Y.
Ct. App. 1950) 9 WH Cases 509.
"
102 Section 3(b) as amended 'Commerce' means trade, commerce, transportation, transmission,
communication, among the several states or (from) between any state (to) any place outside thereof."
(italics supplied). The words in parenthesis were included in the original act and deleted by the
1949 amendments. The changes were designed to eliminate inequalities in the act between employees engaged in foreign commerce based on whether the flow of such foreign commerce is out
of the state rather than in to it. Hence, for example, the amended definition will serve to place
employees of importers on an equal footing with employees of exporters. See "definitions", H. R.
Report No. 1453, 81st Congress, 1st Sessions, October 17, 1949, page 1; Craig v. Heide & Co., 10
WH Cases 9; Addison v. Huron Stevedoring Corp., 10 WH Cases, 40, (D. C. N. Y. 1951).
Section 3(c) reads " 'State' means any State of the United States or the District of Columbia
or any Territory or any Possession of the United States."
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thereof", gives to the act a very wide geographical scope. It includes employees engaged in commerce or in production of goods for commerce, etc., in the manner provided in the act, in the territories of Alaska, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, the Canal Zone,
Guam, Guiana Islands, Samoa, and the Virgin Islands, on much the same basis as
the employees within the 48 states.' 0 8
FLSA Not Applicable to Foreign Employments

It is now well established that the geographical range of the act is confined
to the territorial limits of the United States, its Territories and Possessions. It will
not be applied to work performed in foreign countries,10 4 even though the contract
under which such work is performed is made in the United States proper' 05 and
106
the employees are citizens of the United States.
Leased Areas as "Possessions of United States"

During World War II, the United States, for security purposes, leased a
number of land bases from the British Commonwealth of Nations, and other sovereignties.' 07 Although tnere had been similar leases for land bases in existence prior to those mentioned, 0 8 none of those arrangements were discussed in
congressional reports or debates concerning the scope of the FLSA. Thus the
question was open as to whether the term "possessions" used by Congress to
bound the geographical coverage of the act fixed the limits of its scope so as to
include these bases.
Early State and Federal Rulings

Several state courts had ruled, employees activities performed in the United
States which were closely connected with the construction of military bases in
foreign countries, were within the purview of the act entitling such employees
10 9
to the benefits thereof.

Quinones v. Central Igualdad, 1 WH Cases 285 (D. C. P. R.); Walling v. Arctic Circle
Explor. Co., 56 F. Supp. 944 (D. C. Wash.).
104 Ercole v. Pictorial Research, Inc., (N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 8 WH Cases 138; Greenstein v. Pan108

American Airways, 113 N. Y. L. J. 1520; Burns v. Metcalfe Const. Co., 69 F. Supp. 38 (D. C. Mo.).
105 Berhand v. Metcalfe Const. Co., 64 F. Supp. 953 (D. C. Neb.); See also Soviet Amer.
Sec. Corp., v. Bolger, 16 F. Supp. 622 (D. C. N. J. 1936) and Westbrook v. Elder, 264 Mich. 138,

249 N. W. 617.
106 Filardo v. Foley Bros., Inc., 45 N.Y.S.2d 262, 181 Misc. 136; Finnan v. Elmhurst Contracting
Co., (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1950) 9 WH Cases 686, however, such employees will be entitled to overtime
compensation under the Eight Hour Law where work is performed on leased areas.
107 See Departmernt of State Publication. No. 1726, Executive Agreement Series 204 (Greenland) and

205 (Liberia).

108 As to Cuban Base see International Acts, Protocols and Agreements (S. Doc. 357,, 61st Cong.
2nd Sess.,) ; as to Panama Canal Zone see Isthmanian Canal Convention, 33 Stat. 2234.
109 Simkins v. Elmhurst Const. Co., 46 N.Y.S.2d 26; Steiner v. Pleasantville Const. Co., 49 N.

Y.S.2d

42;

Eckert v. Elmhurst Const. Co., 5 WH Cases 397 (N. Y. City Ct.).
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However, in the first case directly on the question to reach a federal court
of the first instance, 110 the court refused to extend the benefits of the act to employees of a contractor engaged by the United States to construct a defense base
on certain areas in the Bermuda Islands leased to the United States by Great
Britain, since the leased areas were not "possessions" of the United States, and
that, being purely a political question, must be decided by the legislative and
executive departments and not by the courts (relying upon Jones v. United States,
137 U. S. 202 and Pearcy v. Stranahan, 205 U. S. 257, 265). The Second Circuit

Court of Appeals reversed, 111 and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the importance of this question concerning the geographical extent
12
of the act.1
Foreign Areas Leased by U. S. are 'Possessions"
In affirming the view of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in favor of
coverage, the Supreme Court held the question is not a political one beyond the
competence of the court to decide; that Congress has power in certain situations
to regulate the actions of our citizens in criminal matters outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States, hence, this being true as to crimes, a fortiori civil
controls may apply to liabilities created by statutory regulation of labor contracts
even if aliens may be involved where the incidents regulated occur on areas under
the control, though not within the territorial jurisdiction or sovereignty, of the
nation enacting the legislation.113 Congress derives its power from the Constitution and the lease provisions to regulate labor conditions on these bases, and
whether or not its exercise of that power is effective beyond the boundaries of
National Sovereignty is a matter of statutory construction for the courts. The
Court adopted the view that where the aim was to regulate labor relations in an
area vital to the national life of the United States, it seems reasonable to construe
its provisions to have force where the nation has sole power, rather than to limit
coverage to sovereignty, and the facts indicated an intention on the part of
Congress in the use of the term "possession" to have the act apply to employeremployee relationships on foreign territory under lease to the United States for
11
military bases. '

110
111

Connell v. Vemillya Brown Co., 73 F. Supp. 860 (D. C. N. Y.).
164 F.2d 924.

Vermillya-Brown Co., v. Connell, 335 U. S. 377.
It is significant to note, the Supreme Court in its consideration of this case, accorded recognition
to the fact that the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division had issued a statement of general
policy and a ruling which directed all his agencies to apply the act to a Canal Zone Base located
on foreign leased areas, admittedly a territory over which the United States had no sovereignty.
See C. F. R. 1947, Supp. Title 29, pp. 4392-93.
114 To the same effect see, Crowe v. Elmhurst Const. Co., 74 N.Y.S.2d 445, involving work on a
defense base in British Guiana leased from Great Britain; Scholl v. McWillians, 169 F.2d 729
(CCA2); Hardiman v. Johnson Corp., 10 WH Cases 213, (N.Y. Cty. Ct. 1951).
112
118
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Foreign Military Installations in Areas not Under Lease to United StatesNot "Possessions"
Thus far, it would seem, the application of the act is limited to activities concerned with operations connected with military bases located on foreign leased
areas, since one court has refused to extend the benefits of the FLSA to employees
working at foreign military installations in areas not under lease to the United
16
States.I
Conclusion
The foregoing discussion points up, in a general way, but a very few of the
many complicated problems under the FLSA constantly engaging the atention
of the courts. This writer conservatively estimates that there now exists, millions
of dollars of contingent employer liabilities for back wages dire employees, liquidated damages and attorney's fees due thereon. 115a If the courts have not, to a much
greater extent, been flooded with litigation on this subject, it is only because
the enforcement facilities of the Wage and Hour Division are not sufficiently
adequate to cope with these violations of the act, and generally speaking, lawyers
are not sufficiently cognizant of the potential of fees resulting from this type
of litigation.
Some of the most involved problems arising under the act, i.e., the interpretation and application of the exemption provisions, the establishment of the "regular
rate" for the purpose of calculating overtime compensation, the application of
the child labor provisions, and many other intricate situations covered by the
act, have not been touched upon here.
To be sure, the greater part of the confusion stems from the conflict of
opinion existing among the courts having jurisdiction of issues arising under the
act. There are many hundreds of federal and state courts throughout the United
States and the Territories within whose jurisdiction these cases fall. These courts
are not individual or corporate bodies for the promotion of particular objects,
as much as they are personal. Each such tribunal is separate and independent of
Filardo v. Foley Bros., Inc., 45 N.Y.S.2d 262, 181 Misc. 136, in which the court refused
to apply the act to a cook employed at a defense base in Iran by a company constructing a base
for the United States Government.
115

Activities of employees connected with construction work being performed on "leased areas"
may not be within the FLSA, however such employees may be entitled to overtime compensation
under the provisions of the Eight Hour Law Finnan v. Elmhurst Contracting Co., (N. Y. Sup. Ct.
1950) 9 WH Cases 686.
115a See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Powell v. United States Cartridge Co.,
339 U. S. 756, wherein he estimates that the contingent liabilities to the United States arising from
claims for overtime compensation, liquidated damages and attorney fees, in the cost-plus-affixed-fee
contractors' cases, will run to as much as $250,000,000.00.
There would seem to be some justification for this estimate. Upon remand of the Powell
case for further action by the lower court, these damages were fixed at approximately $248,000.00.
The Powell case is only one of many such cases in which the same question is involved.
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every other tribunal. State court judges are elected or appointed to serve for as
long as ten years or more, and the judges of the federal courts are appointed for life.
These judges, numbering perhaps in the thousands, differ considerably as to their
experiences, party affiliations, and their political, economic and social views. It
is, therefore, apparent how and why there has developed this confusion and conflict
concerning the interpretation of a dynamic statute such as the FLSA with all of
its social and economic implications affecting so many millions of citizens on a
daily basis.
It is, perhaps, because of these conditions, that it would seem to be the position of the Wage and Hour Division, in its enforcements policies, to rely for its
conclusions only upon the rulings of the Supreme Court of the United States,
where they are available, otherwise to depend upon its thirteen years of experience,
in preference to the conclusions of the lower courts. Surely, it is a matter of record
that the lower courts are not obliged to, and few do, respect the opinions of the
other lower courts. This is many times true of the ordinary conflicts which exist between inferior state courts. So far as federal courts are concerned, one need only
refer to the long list of cases construing the validity of "New Deal" legislation over
the past twenty years. During that period, commodity, price and labor laws enacted
by Congress were valid in some states but invalid in other states because the federal
district and circuit courts came to opposite conclusions upon the same question.
Albeit, it is not necessary to go outside the FLSA to prove this point. For example,
on the question of the application of the overtime compensation requirements of
Section 7 of the FLSA to cost-plus-a fixed-fee contractors' employees, there was
a general conflict of opinion over the whole country as to whether these employees
were excluded from the acts' benefits. Ver/ few problems have ever resulted in so
many differences of opinion among the courts, involving also as many different
approaches and legal logic as there were cases upon the subject." 6 Here is conFor cases holding in favor of coverage: Lassiter v. Hercules Powder Co., 73 F. Supp. 264
(D. C. Tenn.) affirmed 171 F.2d 263; McCumskey v. Norden, Inc., 88 N.Y.S.2d 547 (N. Y. Sup.
Ct.); Bauler v. Pressed Steel Car Co., 9 WH Cases 416 (CCA7); Umthum v. Day & Zimmerman,
16 N.W.2d 258; Timberlake v. Day & Zimmerman, 49 F. Supp. 28; Clyde & Broderick, 144 F.2d
351; Bell v. Porter, 156 F.2d 117; Ware v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 6 WH Cases 160 (D. C. Ind.);
Atlantic Co., v. Walling, 131 F.2d 518; Krueger v. L. A. Shipbuilding Corp., 6 WH Cases 831,
(D. C. Caiif.); Bailey v. Porter, 6 WH Cases 1017 (D. C. Ill.); Burke v. Mesta Machine Co.,
79 F. Supp. 588, (D. C. Pa.); Kenney v. Wigton-Abbott Corp., 80 F. Supp. 489 (D. C. N. J.);
Jackson v. Northwest Air Lines, 77 F. Supp. 32 (D. C. Minn.).
For cases holding against coverage: Kennedy v. Silas-Mason Co., 68 F. Supp. 586, affirmed
164 F. 2d 1016 (CCA5) ; Anderson v. Federal Cartridge Co., 72 F. Supp. 639 (D. C. Minn.);
Barksdale v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, 70 F. Supp. 690 (D. C. Ark.); Deal v. Leonard, 196 S.W.2d
991 (Ark. App.); Creel v. Lone Star Defense Corp., 191 F.2d 964 (CCA5); Ackerman v. Republic
Aviation Co., 82 F. Supp. 578 (D. C. N. Y.); Brennan v. Federal Cartridge Corp., 175 F.2d 732
(CCA7) ; Aaron v. Ford, etc., 174 F.2d 730; Stewart v. Kaiser Co., 71 F. Supp. 551 (D. C. Ore.);
Hayes v. Hercules Powder Co., 7 F. R. D. 599 (D. C. Mo.); Reed v. Murphy, 168 F.2d
257; Selby v. Jones Const. Co., 175 F.2d 143 (CCA9); Torres v. Lockjoint Pipe Co., 9 WH
Cases 27 (D. C. P. R.).
These are but a few of a very large number of cases decided both ways, some of which were
divergent views emanating out of the same federal circuit by different judges of the districts.
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vincing proof and a clear example of the type of conflict extant on many FLSA
questions.
The writer suggests that there is much that lawyers can do to overcome the
existing confusion by informing themselves concerning the fundamental principles
which distinguish the interpretation and application of the FLSA from other
congressional legislation dealing with employer-employee relationships. However, if this discussion serves no more useful purpose than to arouse the general
interest of the legal profession to the possibilities inherent in the subject, this effort
will have been justified.

